Watching Liverpool on Tuesday night was an exercise in trying to control my temper. Not because I was particularly bothered about whether the Anfield club succeeded in beating Paris Saint-Germain to reach the semi-finals of the Champions and how that seemed increasingly unlikely as the match unfolded, but more so because of Arne Slot’s tactics. Liverpool are just a complete mess.

As someone who covers the Bundesliga quite extensively, none of it made sense. Florian Wirtz continues to be a supportive figure to Liverpool’s main attacking threats, rather than occupying that role himself. Dominik Szoboszlai seems to be tasked with being the Swiss army knife in Slot’s system, whether that be as a No.8 or a right-back. And, despite the aforementioned playmaking No.10s at his disposal, Slot seems to prefer Ryan Gravenberch as the midfielder who makes late runs and tries to link up with the striker. The less said about Jeremie Frimpong being played as a traditional right-back and being asked to do some defending, the better.

None of it really made much sense. Which is, largely, how much of Liverpool’s season has gone. Slot may have been an excellent head coach last season, but he now seems to be a manager who is simply failing to find solutions to the problems that lay before him at Anfield. Where he did so well to continue the impressive form of the squad he inherited from Jürgen Klopp, he now looks at complete odds with the team he’s been given this season. And, without making too many excuses for the Dutchman, it certainly seems as though he had little say in who joined and left the club last summer but was nonetheless expected to fit all these square pegs into round holes.

Whether Slot survives to take another stab at it next season remains to be seen, but irrespective of which manager is in the Anfield dugout after the summer, it seems as though the club may have found itself in this mess by building a new squad without a huge amount of consideration for who their actual manager is. While Liverpool are by no means the only Premier League club to trip up in this regard, it’s a clear departure from the traditional style of English clubs building a squad in tandem with their manager’s input. And it clearly isn’t working.

What makes that so interesting is the fact that a number of England’s biggest clubs have faltered in recent years because they’ve made the same mistake. Manchester United may have humoured Erik Ten Hag with a few signings from the Eredivisie, but the club clearly put little thought into how Ruben Amorim was going to work his tactics around the squad he inherited. And Chelsea, who now look set to miss out on the Champions League next season, have shown absolutely no regard for buying players or building squads that align with their ideal head coach on the sideline.

However, none of these clubs have struggled with this issue more than Tottenham Hotspur. As this excellent ESPN article from earlier this week revealed, the North London club are now facing the very real threat of relegation because they ignored some rather obvious metrics and statistics to instead build a squad of players that have “a combo of endurance, explosiveness and speed” but, ultimately, can’t pass well enough to actually dominate and win games.

Now, as a keen admirer of sports statistics and analytics, I doubt O’Hanlon would argue that what Tottenham really need is to ditch their scouting and recruitment department and bring in Harry Redknapp to fix things. Nor do I. But I struggle to believe that Spurs would be in this mess had they sought out greater input from Thomas Frank, Ange Postecoglou, Antonio Conte or Nuno Espírito Santo in the last four or five years, as they spent over €1 billion on new players. A manager needs to be part of the squad-planning process. Not a separate contractor tasked with making the most of what he’s handed.

Perhaps in an attempt to modernise an old manager-led system, Premier League clubs have gone a little too far in their streamlining of the scouting and recruitment process. Maybe a bit of friction along the way - such as a manager having a “feel” for certain players or relying on unfashionable talents to fill the cracks in his squad - isn’t actually a bad thing. And proof of that can most likely be found at the top of the Premier League table.

While Manchester City and Arsenal have undoubtedly spent unprecedented amounts of money by their own historic standards to get to where they are today, and each relies on the best scouting and recruitment teams in the business, both clubs are also entirely tethered to the managers who pick the teams each week. I don’t think Pep Guardiola or Mikel Arteta are out scouting players through the summer off-season or spend their evenings thumbing through WyScout reports, but I do think they have a significant influence over which players do and do not end up at their clubs. And, as such, their squads reflect their own coaching styles and tactics.

Maybe, as more and more Premier League clubs look to utilise the transfer window to scoop up young players to sell for profits and in return the league gets crammed full of the kind of cookie-cutter, template players that have led Spurs to disarray, smarter clubs will instead turn against the grain and return to a system that gives managers the freedom and authority to buy players based on what they perceived to be the strengths and weaknesses of their own squads. Nobody is expecting a return to Ferguson or Wenger-esque control of England’s biggest clubs. But perhaps too many clubs are overlooking the importance of managers at their own peril.

Everton’s 2-0 win over Burnley on Tuesday night was very on-brand for a David Moyes team. Solid at the back, the breakthrough coming after a bombardment of set-pieces and, ultimately, all three points thanks to the industry and drive of a midfield leader. It wasn’t particularly pretty or even a match that will live long in the memory, but it was effective. And in many ways, it summed up the remarkable return to form for the Merseyside club since Moyes returned last January.

Indeed, while much of the world has focused on the demise of Tottenham and, to a far lesser extent, Liverpool, Newcastle and now perhaps even Aston Villa too, Moyes’ Everton side have slowly but surely climbed up the league table and now find themselves sitting just five points off their Anfield rivals in eighth place. In fact, since Moyes returned to the club last January, only five Premier League teams had picked up more points than Everton in the English top-flight ahead of Wednesday night’s fixtures. Slow and steady wins the race, and the Toffees’ surprising but resolute march to the top half of the table is a perfect testament to that.

Perhaps the reason why Everton have avoided the limelight for much of this season is simply down to how they pick up points. In nine games against the seven teams above them in the league table, Moyes’ side have won just seven points and averaged just 0.78 points per game. But in the 20 games against the 12 teams below them in the table, they’ve managed to lose just three games and have averaged an impressive 1.80 points per game. No huge upsets or giant-killings to write home about. Just Everton doing exactly what’s asked of them. And that’s really the secret to Moyes’ success as a Premier League manager.

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Following Tuesday’s win over Burnley, Moyes is now sitting on 1.48 points per game across all competitions in his second stint at the club. That’s a notable jump on Sean Dyche’s record of 1.23 points per game and the best return for a manager of the Merseyside club since Carlo Ancelotti departed in the summer of 2021. To be fair to the Scottish tactician, this more or less mirrors his underappreciated success at West Ham too. While very few fans of the Hammers shed a tear when Moyes departed the London club, he did leave with an average of 1.34 points per game in the Premier League - a record that bested all of his predecessors since 2003 and one that Julen Lopetegui (1.15 points per game), Graham Potter (1.00) and now Nuno Espírito Santo (0.96) have failed to match.

But what’s so fascinating about Moyes and this Everton team is that there’s so much potential for them to get even better. As the Athletic’s Patrick Boyland wrote back in February about Moyes, he is “an advocate of picking what he believes to be his best 11 players and finding a way to make it work.” And that has clearly brought plenty of success to the club in the past 14 months. But it has also meant that younger and exceptionally exciting players like Merlin Röhl, Adam Aznou, Carlos Alcarez, and most notably, Tyler Dibling have often been overlooked for more experienced and perhaps more reliable players. Dibling, remarkably, cost the club an incredible €40.5m in the summer but has so far featured in just 14% of the club’s league campaign to date.

This has been a pertinent criticism that some of Everton’s supporters have thrown at Moyes this season. And it’s entirely understandable. But Moyes is no old fart who refuses to see the benefit of youth. Whether it be Leighton Baines, Jack Rodwell, Leon Osman or even Wayne Rooney, the Scot was always happy to make space for young players in his team during his first spell at the club. But the important factor then was that each of those players proved to be reliable members of Moyes’ starting XI. That remains the case now, as is the case with 19-year-old Harrison Armstrong regularly starting in midfield this season, and it’ll surely only be a matter of time before Dibling & Co. start getting more game time next season.

And with those young players coming of age will likely be several new faces too. For all of Moyes’ good work, few would suggest that Everton’s squad is up to scratch. And there are a number of reasons to suggest that the club will invest heavily in new players next season. For a start, the club will likely move on a number of senior players whose contracts come to an end in the summer. Séamus Coleman, Michael Keane, Idrissa Gueye and Vitaliy Mykolenko could all be nudged off the wage bill for free this summer, while Nathan Patterson, Beto and Dwight McNeil may be sold as they enter the final year of their deals.

Although the club did spend a considerable amount of money in the 2025 summer transfer window - just under €130m on Dibling, Thiero Barry & Co. - the club’s austere approach to the transfer window in previous seasons means that Everton’s net spend over the last five seasons is actually just €14m. Which is the third lowest in the entire Premier League. And suggests that they may have more money to spend ahead of next season.

There’s also the new stadium factor. As the pointed out in his review of Everton’s last financial results, the Merseyside club ranked twelfth for total revenue from matchday income but also had one of the worst returns in the league for matchday revenue per game. The new stadium not only offers bigger crowds but also far more executive seating to boost the club’s coffers for every home match. As the esteemed financial writer concluded, the club’s new home “will offer additional revenue-generating opportunities that could be transformative to the club’s fortunes.”

It remains to be seen whether Evefton can actually spend a huge amount of money this summer without cashing in on stars like Jarrad Branthwaite. But the fact that they were able to reject offers for the young defender last summer suggests that the club’s new owners may have things under control.

Ultimately, things can only get better. Moyes has been working with scraps for most of the season and managed to pull off some minor miracles. A thorough rebuild in the summer, alongside the embedding of some impressive young players, should give the Everton boss better tools to work with and, with it, a better return on the pitch. But don’t expect fireworks. Moyes works best when he’s out of the limelight. And while our attention is drawn elsewhere in the league, he’s slowly but surely taking Everton back to where they think they belong.

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In many ways Fulham are perhaps the most impressive club in the Premier League. They don’t have owners that sink untold fortunes into the club, they aren’t part of some complicated multi-club ownership model that funnels young players into their ranks and they certainly don’t have legions of fans who pour money into the club’s coffers at every home game. And yet, the London minnows continue to not only exist among the giants of the English top-flight but actually seem to thrive despite everything to the contrary saying they should be fighting off relegation every season.

I hope that doesn’t come across as condescending or just plain rude, but it is the truth. Marco Silva’s current squad cost just €305.05 million in transfer fees to assemble - which makes it the sixteenth most-expensive squad in the English top-flight. And, according to Deloitte’s latest report, the Craven Cottage side have the fifteenth highest wage bill in the Premier League. Whichever way you chalk it up, Fulham should be just a few spots above relegation each season. And yet, thanks to some smart signings and regular miracles performed by Marco Silva on the sidelines, the club hasn’t finished lower than thirteenth since they returned to the division. Not since Roy Hodgson was calling the shots in West London have things been as golden as they are now. But that could be about to change.

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Fulham’s predicament

A rather large storm cloud is taking shape on the horizon in the form of the Premier League’s new SCR (squad cost ratio) rules that come into force in the 2026/27 season and stipulate that clubs must not spend more than 85 percent of their football-related revenue on their squad through transfer fees and wages. Clubs can go over this figure for a limited period of time, but will then face fines and then potential points deductions. And, crucially, the ratio is limited to matchday revenue, broadcasting and commercial income and player sales. And Fulham aren’t exactly market leaders in that regard.

According to the Athletic, Fulham’s current ratio stands at 91 percent, which is the second highest in the league. The only club that currently exceeds them is Bournemouth, whose squad cost ratio stands at a rather worrying 104% of their revenue. What this means is that Fulham will either have to reduce their costs or increase their revenue. Which is a tricky task for a club with a passionate but undoubtedly limited fanbase and a squad that is a far cry from the kindergarten-like teams of Brighton, Brentford or the aforementioned Cherries.

Indeed, Fulham’s current squad leaves the club somewhat flat-footed to deal with these new financial demands in the coming years. While Silva’s side have unquestionably punched above their weight for the last four seasons, they’ve done so with a squad of older, more experienced players. Not only does Silva’s typical starting XI have the highest average age in the league this season, but the Portuguese tactician has actually fielded eight of the 10 oldest starting XIs on any given matchday among all clubs in this current league campaign.

As we can see in the graph above, this has clearly been a characteristic of Silva’s success at Fulham. In the season prior to Silva’s arrival, the average age of Fulham’s starting XI was just 25.2, but that figure has gradually increased over the years to a high of 28.4 in the 2023/24 season. It has fallen somewhat to 28.1 this season, but as we can clearly see the Portuguese manager undoubtedly prefers to rely on senior, experienced players to ensure Fulham steer well clear of relegation. On the one hand, it’s clearly been a necessity for Fulham in recent years, but on the other it poses a huge problem for them going forward.

For all of Silva’s success at Craven Cottage, he hasn’t had to contend with wholesale player sales each and every summer like other mid-table clubs. Since joining the club in 2021, Fulham have made just €180m from player sales. That places them 22nd among all English clubs over that period of time for income from player sales and considerably behind the likes of Nottingham Forest (€305.8m), West Ham (€392m), Bournemouth (€405m), Brighton (€604m) and Wolves (€612m). And while Fulham fans would be perfectly justified in saying the club’s decision not to follow a similar business model has been the cornerstone of the stability and success Silva has brought to the club, it now puts them in a tricky position going forward.

How they’re trying to solve it

To Fulham’s credit, they seem to have taken this future problem extremely seriously and are already trying to slowly but surely rejig their squad to make it younger and potentially more profitable on the transfer market.

Last season the club signed Emile Smith Rowe (25) and Ryan Sessegnon (25) and this season has seen them spend the best part of €80m on Oscar Bobb (22) from Manchester City and Kevin (23) from Shakhtar Donetsk. They also tried and failed to sign Ricardo Pepi (23) from PSV in January. In fact, the average age of Fulham’s signings this season stands at just 24.4 and has been steadily falling over the last three seasons from 26.0 in 23/24 and 25.1 in 24/25. And while Fulham have had the highest average age for Premier League squads in each of their last four seasons in the English top-flight, that number has fallen from 28.3 to 27.7 in the last three seasons.

So the London club are undoubtedly aware of the dark clouds on the horizon and are trying to prepare for the coming storm. But it remains to be seen whether they’ve done enough to adapt to the new Premier League landscape. The aforementioned signings all look like smart deals on paper, but Smith Rowe has yet to really show the form that made him an exciting prospect at Arsenal, it remains to be seen whether Bobb will be able to rekindle his Man City form following a broken leg in 2024 and Kevin has just three goals and four assists in 27 appearances for the club since becoming their record signing last summer.

The problem that Fulham face in this regard is that they simply don’t have the quantity of young players that the likes of Brighton, Bournemouth or Forest can call upon. And without that scale, it means the club are more or less reliant on Smith Rowe, Kevin & Co. becoming big stars and earning even larger transfer fees down the line. Which is a big ask for the players in question and the club itself, especially if Silva decides to draw a line under his time in West London this summer and considers a move elsewhere next season.

Perhaps a dramatic shift in strategy will be needed next season and in the years to come, and with that, a new manager that is willing to accept that he’s part of a bigger project that involves young players arriving and leaving by the dozen in each transfer window. Maybe Fulham need their own version of Keith Andrews or Andoni Iraola. But one thing is certain; Fulham’s success over the last four years is about to be seriously challenged by these outside factors and the Craven Cottage side will have to be at their absolute best if they hope to keep their impressive footing in the Premier League going forward.

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There was certainly a sense of inevitability about Thomas Frank’s sacking on Wednesday morning, as Tottenham Hotspur finally drew a line under a disastrous managerial spell. Not only had the Dane failed to improve on last season’s horrid league campaign, but he also held the unenviable record of being the worst Spurs boss in 20 years based on his points-per-game average across all competitions. No ifs, no buts. He clearly had to go.

However, with Frank now out the door the attention of disgruntled Tottenham fans will now quickly look to find a new avenue to exorcise their concerns about the club’s proximity to the bottom of the Premier League table and the future of a team that has now demonstrably failed on the pitch for two consecutive seasons. Even if Spurs fans did justifiably want Frank sacked, few would suggest that the club’s problems began and ended with the Dane.

As such, the hunt for a new manager not only takes centre stage but also requires additional context. Whether or not it was simply a coincidence, Roberto De Zerbi’s departure from Marseille just a few hours before Frank left Tottenham essentially lit social media ablaze with speculation. Add to that speculative links to Xavi or Xabi Alonso with the age-old hopes and dreams of Mauricio Pochettino returning to the club and the discourse surrounding Tottenham’s current predicament quickly descended into a debate over which saviour was going to show up and single-handedly turn the club around.

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This, of course, is nonsense. While Tottenham absolutely have to find a manager that can do a far better job than Frank, the far greater concern for Spurs fans at this moment in time should be an acknowledgement of why Frank didn’t work in the first place and how the club can avoid making that mistake again. Just as the Dane hasn’t been the only factor in Tottenham’s demise this season, we also simply can’t conclude that his successor will be the perfect solution to all the club’s problems.

In this regard, we’re obviously referring to Frank working within Brentford’s overarching system but then failing in Tottenham’s. Hiring the manager in the hope that he could do what he did at Brentford without the infrastructure that allowed him to succeed at the Bees was not so much putting the cart before the horse but rather buying the cart and wondering why it couldn’t pull itself without said horse.

Tottenham aren’t the first club to make this mistake. Whether it was Graham Potter’s disastrous spell at Chelsea after leaving Brighton, Ruben Amorim failing to adapt to life at Manchester United after Sporting and even De Zerbi leaving Brighton only to find the chaotic nature of Marseille too much to handle, we’ve seen countless examples of bigger clubs thinking managers can conveniently pack up their success and apply it elsewhere. With regards to Spurs, they should have perhaps already known this before appointing Frank; considering the manner in which Nuno Espírito Santo’s move from Wolverhampton to North London fell apart so quickly.

However, highlighting these failed managerial stints isn’t an exercise in retrospectively pointing out the mistakes in identifying and hiring coaches, but rather growing proof that to succeed in the modern Premier League you have to do so much more than spend money on players and hope a half-decent manager can pull them all together to make a successful squad. In many ways, the best-run clubs in England build the right squad long before they even think about bringing in the right coach. And that’s something Tottenham certainly haven’t been doing in the last few years.

Perhaps this is where Tottenham fans and I part ways in regards to the problems at the club, but despite Frank’s shortcomings as manager of the club I always found myself sympathising with him simply because his squad never looked up to the task of matching the club’s expectations of finishing in the top six and pushing for the top four. Much of that was simply down to the club missing so many stars through injury, but I also take issue with any claims that suggest that this team is perfectly good enough to challenge for the top four.

The North London side have certainly spent money like a top four club. In the last five seasons Tottenham’s net spend in the transfer window (€665.8 million) is the fourth highest in the Premier League, ahead of Newcastle, Liverpool and Manchester City. And the total cost of this current Spurs squad in transfer fees stands at €865.4m - just €60m less than Arsenal have spent on their team and ahead of Newcastle and Aston Villa. Of course, this doesn’t take into account wages - which Tottenham are notably stringent with in regards to their domestic rivals - but it still points to a lot of money spent and not much of a return in terms of sporting success.

This is perhaps where the real problems lie with Tottenham. The club had until very recently run a co-sporting director operation, where Johan Lange focused on scouting, the youth academy and player analytics, while Fabio Paratici (who departed this month to join Fiorentina) was effectively in charge of recruitment and transfer strategy for the first team. And, as a result, we’ve seen the club implementing two contrasting and often contradictory recruitment policies simultaneously in the transfer window.

For example, this season alone has seen Spurs pick up a number of exciting, young talents like Luka Vuskovic, Kota Takai and Souza. And last season saw the club swoop in for excellent prospects Antonín Kinský and Lucas Bergvall. Each of these players has bags of potential and points to a club that clearly knows how to not only identify excellent young players but also has the resources and information to take advantage of markets outside of the traditional stomping grounds of Premier League clubs, like Japan, Croatia and the Czech Republic.

However, there’s another side to Tottenham’s transfer policy that screams of desperation and short-term planning. While there’s nothing particularly wrong with players like Xavi Simons, Mohammed Kudus, Mathys Tel, Randal Kolo Muani and João Palhinha, they were basically all either transfer listed or conveniently pushing for moves away from their previous clubs. The same can be said of players like Dominic Solanke (signed because of a release clause), James Maddison (had to leave after Leicester City’s relegation), Dejan Kulusevski (desperate to leave Juventus) and Richarlison (Everton under financial pressure and had to sell), which all points to Tottenham more or less wheeling and dealing from one transfer window to the next.

Some of those players have done a good job since joining Tottenham. I’m a card-carrying member of the Simons fan club and players like Richarlison, Kudus and Solanke have actually improved their goals and assists per 90 since moving from Everton, West Ham and Bournemouth respectively. But whether any of the aforementioned stars in the previous paragraph are good enough to start for other “Big Six” teams is certainly up for debate. And that’s before we even consider the troubling injury records that many of them have.

Regardless, the manner in which each of these stars has made the move to North London has never come across as part of a long-term strategy to build a coherent squad. Unlike Arsenal or Manchester City, who put so much time and effort into fortifying the strength in depth of their squads, or Liverpool, who (well, until this season…) tend to focus their somewhat limited transfer budget on specific stars for specific needs in the squad, Tottenham’s squad seems to be made up of either exceptionally gifted young players or just perfectly solid Premier League stars that happened to be for sale at the time.

Ultimately, Tottenham’s next managerial appointment will of course matter a great deal. But unless it is accompanied by structural clarity, a coherent recruitment model and genuine alignment between the boardroom and the dugout, it risks becoming yet another name added to an increasingly familiar cycle. Spurs do not need a saviour; they need a system. Until that foundation is properly rebuilt, no manager - whether it be Alonso, De Zerbi or Pochettino - will be able to turn promise into progress or spending into sustained success.

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Kai Havertz’s late intervention in Arsenal’s 1-0 win over Chelsea in the League Cup on Tuesday night couldn’t have been better. In a match that had offered very little attacking intent from either side, it was particularly notable to fans and critics alike that Mikel Arteta’s team lacked an obvious attacking edge. Gabriel Martinelli and Noni Madueke huffed and puffed on either wing while Viktor Gyökeres continued to look jarringly out of sync with his team mates. It was a game that was crying out for Havertz and he duly came on and scored the goal to settle the nerves, if not necessarily the tie.

Plenty has been written and said about Gyökeres and his struggles in North London, so I don’t feel any particular urge to add to the poor man’s misery. But while I’m sure he remains confident that he will eventually click into gear with Arsenal, even he must be wondering whether the opportunity to do exactly that has come and gone, now that Havertz has returned to Arteta’s squad after a lengthy injury. Because not only is the German international Arsenal’s best goalscoring talent, but he also significantly improves the players around him. And that’s ultimately all that will matter between now and the end of the season.

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The manner in which Havertz has come on leaps and bounds since his poorly received €75 million move from Chelsea in 2023 is nothing short of remarkable. First tasked with playing as a box-to-box midfielder, the former Bayer Leverkusen star has slowly but surely developed into an expert in the final third for Arsenal. Arteta still often plays him as a No.10 or on either wing, but to the surprise of Arsenal fans (and many back in Germany) he does seem to genuinely thrive as a centre forward for the North London club.

For example, when we filter all of Havertz’s game time in the Premier League down to just the games he played as a striker, we find that the 26-year-old forward currently averages 0.49 goals and 0.33 assists per 90 minutes of league football. That’s a very impressive return for the Aachen-born talent and considerably better than Gabriel Jesus’ 0.70 goals and assists per 90 and, to no surprise, more than double Gyökeres’ 0.37 goal contributions per 90 in the English top-flight for Arsenal. In fact, as we can see in the graph above, Havertz not only tends to create more goals than Arsenal’s other strikers but also outscores them too. There’s really no contest here.

But we’re not just talking about a player that walks into Arteta’s squad and steals all the glory. What’s really fascinating about Havertz’s Arsenal form is that he clearly improves the players around him in attack and that’s clear for all to see when we look at the league stats of Bukayo Saka and Martin Ødegaard.

Let’s start with the Norwegian playmaker. Ødegaard has been far from his best this season, largely due to injury and simply looking far more jaded than usual but it’ll be interesting to see if he enjoys an uptick in form with Havertz back in the squad. Since the towering German talent joined Arsenal, Ødegaard’s form has varied wildly depending on whether Havertz is playing alongside him. So much so that without the German, Ødegaard has averaged 0.37 goals or assists per 90 in the Premier League but with Havertz on the pitch alongside the blonde-haired playmaker, his average has shot up by 43 percent to 0.53 goals and assists per 90.

The same can certainly be said for Saka. The England international is currently averaging his lowest goals and assists per 90 in the Premier League since 2021 and that’s in no small part due to Havertz missing almost the entire league campaign up until now. Much like Ødegaard, Saka’s career goal contributions average stands at a perfectly respectable 0.51 per 90 in the Premier League without Havertz. But when we then isolate Saka’s form when the German forward is alongside him on the pitch, we see that number almost double to 0.91 goals and assists per 90.

None of this is to say that Havertz is some magician that can suddenly get the best out of Saka and Ødegaard, but it perhaps explains why Gyökeres has had such a tough time syncing up with his team mates when they’re clearly so attuned to thriving alongside another No.9 in Havertz who has a very different style of play from his Swedish counterpart.

Either way, this season is just about getting over the line for Arsenal and in that regard Havertz’s return couldn’t have come at a better time. The German international is Arteta’s best goalscorer and clearly gets the best out of the club’s key attacking talents. And that should be a welcomed boost for the North London club as they approach the final stretch of this Premier League title race.

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Michael Carrick has done a lot in a very short space of time at Manchester United. And the club’s attacking players like Bryan Mbeumo and Bruno Fernandes clearly stood out in the wins against Manchester City and Arsenal. But what intrigues me the most about the club’s turnaround in form is how Kobbie Mainoo is at the very centre of it all.

Mainoo was notably ostracised from Man Utd’s first team under Ruben Amorim and it’s not hard to see why. In the Portuguese manager’s 3-4-3 system, Amorim needed two expert midfielders that could either defend or attack. There was no room for ambiguity or players that could do a bit of both when it was just two midfielders in the middle of the park, often against three opposing players, and that meant Mainoo was frozen out.

One of the most obvious benefits to Carrick going back to a 4-2-3-1 is that it allowed Mainoo to return to the team as a box-to-box midfielder and as we all saw in the last two games he clearly thrived in his preferred position and role against both Man City and Arsenal. You may have seen the stats posted around the web noting that Mainoo outran all other players in both games, which clearly showcased his determination in the middle of the pitch. But that wasn’t the only stat that stands out in both matches: Mainoo was also third among all Man Utd players for total passes in both games and second only to Bruno Fernandes for total touches across the pitch.

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Indeed, what made Mainoo’s return so important to Man Utd in these two games is how he facilitates the players around him. The English midfielder isn’t a world-class defensive midfielder - that’s Casemiro - and he certainly isn’t a league-leading playmaker or No.10 - that’s Fernandes - but he provides the crucial link between the two. A facilitator, if you will, that can help both players in equal measure to get the best out of their game. In other words, it wasn’t so much that Mainoo was the best player on the pitch against Man City or Arsenal but that his presence in midfield allowed Casemiro and Fernandes to be two of the best players in their respective positions.

Suddenly Fernandes isn’t having to play in his own half, picking out long balls but is instead in the final third, playing off the forwards. When we compare the player’s heat map (via Opta) in the recent win over Man City and Man Utd’s 3-0 defeat to Pep Guardiola’s team earlier in the season, we can see that in the first game - in which Fernandes was in a midfield duo with Manuel Ugarte - he spent far more time in his own half or around the centre circle, but in the second game he spent far more time in the final third.

And the same can obviously be said of Casemiro, who often got dragged out wide to snuff out counter-attacks before, but now has Mainoo there to cover that ground and let him stay central to protect Man Utd’s back line. That’s something that Amorim never quite understood during his time at Old Trafford but clearly Carrick has been aware of it for quite some time.

Just as a good poem or novel encourages us to read between the lines to comprehend a full picture of what’s going on, football also needs these minor characters to play between the clear stars to build a coherent and fully functioning team. The history of football is full of these somewhat unsung heroes. Whether it be Claude Makélélé, Sergio Busquets or perhaps even Carrick himself during his time at Man Utd. Each of these players knew how to occupy key spaces on the pitch, did the unseen hard work behind the scenes and, crucially, made the players around them much better.

It’s with that in mind that it then comes as no surprise to learn that in an interview with Rio Ferdinand last July, Carrick said Man Utd needed to “have players like that” in reference to Mainoo’s talents in the middle of the pitch and more or less said the Old Trafford club had to build their team around the young midfielder. Now that’s not Carrick saying Mainoo is Man Utd’s answer to problems in attack or defence, he’s simply saying that they always need a player like that in the middle of the park. Someone that can be relied upon to help the players around him in midfield.

And that’s honestly quite refreshing. The sport has become so over-analysed and micro-managed that the concept of a “jack-of-all-trades” is now seen as a bad thing and often sneered at. If a player isn’t a specialist in defence or attack, he’s seemingly useless. That, of course, is complete nonsense. But it’s not hard to see why a manager like Amorim - who is so remarkably rigid with his systems and tactics - would have little room for nuance in his team. And why Man Utd needed someone like Carrick to come along and give Mainoo the space and freedom to flourish at nothing in particular but just do a solid job in the middle of the park.

Obviously those victories over Man City and Arsenal won’t come to define Man Utd’s season or guarantee Carrick the Man Utd job in the summer, but they have done a good job of highlighting why Mainoo is an excellent midfield talent. And, perhaps, have shown Carrick or the man that may come after him how they can get the best out of this team in the coming years.

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Leipzig are (obviously) part of the Red Bull multi-club group, but sit atop of it as the organisation’s main club. That means all the best players from Salzburg, New York, etc. all end up at Leipzig. Which, in turn, helps Leipzig to remain a top four club in the Bundesliga with relative ease.

However, RB don’t write a blank cheque to Leipzig every season. As we know, the German club routinely sells their best players each and every year. That’s because players want to play in the PL but also because Leipzig want to make lots of money. Leipzig are exactly where Red Bull want them to be.

The club utilises their sister clubs to funnel players to a top-five league. It helps them finish high in the Bundesliga and regular UCL football. And showcase players to sell. Leipzig makes money, Red Bull watches an asset grow in value. It’s not about winning games. It’s about accumulating wealth.

Which brings me back to Chelsea. There’s no doubt that the current owners have stuck money into the Stamford Bridge club. Since they took over in 2022, their net spend in the transfer window stands at €870m. That should suggest intent to win things. And yet... something’s not quite right.

The vast majority of that money has been spent on extremely young and untested players. Alejandro Garnacho, Jamie Gittens, Jorrel Hato, Liam Delap... all good prospects. But not exactly world-beaters at this moment in time. And there doesn’t seem to be any inclination to try and build a proper title-challenging squad.

Whether it’s the departure of Conor Gallagher, Noni Madueke, Nicolas Jackson and now speculation over Fernandez and Palmer, it seems as though Chelsea are more interested in moving assets on at the right time, rather than building a team with the right blend of youth and experience.

This has been evident throughout Maresca’s time at the club. He was angry that no ready-made signing was made to replace Colwill last August. And it’s clear that he struggled to contend with the sheer volume of players coming and going at the club.

And now Liam Rosenior - a BlueCo company man - is in charge. Maybe a top-tier manager with clear ambition and demands will be hired in the summer and maybe Palmer and Fernandez won’t be sold. But every time I take a closer look at Chelsea on and off the pitch, I get a sense of deja vu.

As far as I can tell, Chelsea have no real interest in winning the Premier League. The odd cup or a run in Europe suits them just fine. Like Leipzig they’re more interested in being the 3rd/4th best team in the country. Maximise profits, work on growing their assets. It’s finance. Not football.

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At Wolfsburg, Glasner took a team that was essentially mid-table fodder back to the Champions League. But he ultimately left the club after falling out with sporting director Jörg Schmadtke over what he deemed to be unkept promises to strengthen the squad.

He then went to Frankfurt, where he took them to 11th and then 7th in the Bundesliga, two cup finals and the all-important Europa League victory in 2022. But, like at Wolfsburg, Glasner repeatedly complained about the lack of quality in the squad. Rather than add more depth to the team, Frankfurt simply replaced the players they had sold with like-for-like replacements, which led to Glasner and Markus Krösche falling out. Frankfurt were taking a long-term approach; Glasner wanted to win things now. In other words, Frankfurt were unwilling to match his ambitions, and things fell apart quickly.

Before getting sacked, Glasner rather publicly had a tantrum on the sidelines against Hoffenheim then blew up in a post-match press conference. Prior to leaving Frankfurt, his side had won just one of their last 10 games. Does any of this sound familiar, Palace fans?

Glasner is an exceptional head coach. He’s shown that at every club. I think he’s a very tactically adaptable head coach. He’s always changed his tactics and systems to suit the club he’s at. But he really struggles to work within a system that requires clubs to sell their players each season.

I’d truly love to see him at a club like Man Utd, Man City, Bayern, etc., where he doesn’t have to worry about key players being sold every summer. Only then can we really see what he’s truly capable of. Because at each of his last three clubs, his genius has been tripped up by his impatience.

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Crucially, Gallagher is far from a one-dimensional “water carrier”; he offers a box-to-box threat that Spurs’ current options lack. During his final season at Chelsea, he was what I’d describe as a “low-key playmaker,” ranking second for total assists and fourth for passes into the penalty box. Stats show that Tottenham currently lacks midfielders who can successfully dribble into the final third or create chances through key passes, with only Xavi Simons appearing in the league’s top 100 for those metrics. Gallagher’s proven ability to progress the ball and his high volume of touches in the opposing box make him a vital tool for Frank as he looks to turn the club’s league campaign around.

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I think if I had to use one word to describe Liverpool’s performance against Arsenal in midweek it would be “balanced”. They defended well, they attacked well and against an Arsenal side that perhaps struggled to show the conviction to really take the game to Arne Slot’s team, it was a match that Liverpool could have perhaps even won.

It’s no coincidence that Liverpool have looked more coherent since Mohamed Salah departed for AFCON. The Egyptian international remains a spectacular goalscorer but even at his best he was rarely a player that tracked back and put in the hard yards off the ball. And with Jeremie Frimpong in his place on the right wing against Arsenal, the centre of gravity in Liverpool’s attack shifted centrally towards Florian Wirtz.

Liverpool have now played 549 minutes of Premier League football without Salah this season and it’s quite interesting how drastically the Egyptian forward’s absence has helped Wirtz improve in Arne Slot’s team. The stats (per 90 minutes) really tell their own story. In matches without Salah, Wirtz’s total touches per game have increased by 26%, his passes into the penalty box have increased by 67%, his expected goals per game have increased by 43% and his one-vs-one take ons have jumped by 45%. In fact, the only notable stat that has fallen is Wirtz’s key passes per 90, which is down 15% since Salah stepped out of the team.

That’s presumably because he no longer feels obliged to give the ball to Salah at every opportunity, which would inevitably end in the Egyptian shooting. That now means that no player (minimum 1000 minutes) in the Premier League is averaging more successful passes in the final third than Wirtz this season and according to Opta only Dominik Szoboszlai has created more chances in the league for Liverpool than the German international.

Admittedly, it’s hard to draw a definitive correlation between Salah dropping out of the team and Wirtz going from strength to strength. Especially during a period of games that have seen both Alexander Isak and Hugo Ekitike drop out of Slot’s team too. But there is one major stat that convinces me that Wirtz is thriving in Salah’s absence. So far this season two players stand out for touches per 90 in the final third for Liverpool: Wirtz (33.8) and Salah (32.9). They’re essentially identical.

But Ekitike (19.1) and Isak (12.7) are nowhere near them. So I’m not really convinced that the two strikers being absent is what’s giving Wirtz more influence over this team. It seems far more likely to me that Wirtz and Salah both like dictating play. And that’s why Wirtz is thriving in Salah’s absence.

Of course, it isn’t just Wirtz benefitting from it. Liverpool average more goals, more points and fewer conceded goals in league games without Salah than they do with him this season. Which begs the question: should Salah get back into this team when he gets back from AFCON?

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Man Utd are unmanageable

I’m not entirely sure it really matters who is in charge of Manchester United. Perhaps Darren Fletcher or even Ole Gunnar Solskjær can get something else out of this team, but sacking Ruben Amorim is unlikely to make a huge difference in the medium to long-term.

That’s because Man Utd in its modern form is more or less unmanageable.They’ve got a global fanbase that demands first place, two ownership groups that will settle for fourth and, in my opinion, a squad that would struggle to break into the top six.

That’s not to say that Man Utd season ticket holders expect them to be challenging for the league title anytime soon. Those fans have been through the ringer for long enough to simply be happy with a coherent team and functioning management structure. I’m instead referring to their world-wide appeal, which indirectly demands success. That, in turn, puts pressure on the club to prioritise short-term goals over long-term plans.

Amorim wasn’t great. He was far too rigid with his tactics and simply didn’t have the personality to deal with the pressure of managing a club of Man Utd’s size. But I don’t think he was the main problem. Maybe Fletcher can get something out of these players. And to be fair, the club have shifted their transfer policy away from signing expensive players over 25, towards younger players with more potential in the last 18-24 months.

But there’s still so much to be fixed in that squad. Even if players like Leny Yoro, Benjamin Sesko and even Kobbie Mainoo can realise their potential in 2026, it’s still a team underpinned by a midfield of Manuel Ugarte and Casemiro. With an ageing Bruno Fernandes as the sole playmaker in the team.

All of those problems are down to a confusing transfer strategy, put in place by an ownership group that simply aren’t interested in truly rivalling the likes of Man City, Arsenal or Liverpool. And until that changes, it doesn’t really matter if the man in the dugout can perform miracles or not.

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I thought Aston Villa did well to match Arsenal for the first 45 minutes on Tuesday night. The game essentially turned on that Emiliano Martinez mistake just after half time. Regardless, a defeat at the Emirates shouldn’t take anything away from the amazing job Unai Emery has done at the club this season.

Since Emery joined Villa in 2022, the club’s net spend in the transfer window stands at just €47m. For the sake of comparison: Arsenal’s under Mikel Arteta is €899m. Emery/Villa rank twelfth in terms of net spend by clubs under their current managers in the Premier League. Marco Silva has spent more at Fulham. So too has Andoni Iraola at Bournemouth and David Moyes at Everton.

Excluding wages, Villa’s squad cost a total of €389m in total transfer fees to build. That’s only the tenth highest in the league, behind Nottingham Forest and West Ham. Arsenal’s cost €924m in transfer fees.

None of this is to draw any notable comparisons to Arsenal. I’m just noting their figures because it shows the gulf between Emery’s budget at Villa and the top four. Newcastle and Tottenham’s squads cost twice as much as this Villa squad. Which are perhaps better comparisons, considering the inconsistent form of both clubs since 2022.

Either way, the job Emery has done at Villa under tight financial restrictions (whether or not you agree with PSR) is remarkable. He’s effectively working with the tenth most expensive squad in the league, with the thirteenth biggest transfer budget. And somehow his team are third in the league table.

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Some thoughts on Semenyo to Man City

By my count, Antoine Semenyo will be the eleventh winger Man City have signed since Pep Guardiola became their manager in 2016. And I reckon one or two have been unqualified successes.

In total it works out at €610m, assuming Semenyo goes for €75m. That includes Leroy Sane (€52m), Nolito (€18m), Bernardo Silva (€50m), Riyad Mahrez (€67.8m), Ferran Torres (€33.5m), Jack Grealish (€117.5m), Jeremy Doku (€60m), Omar Marmoush (€75m), Savinho (€25m) and Rayan Cherki (€36.5m). That works out at about 32% of the total sum Man City have spent on all transfer fees in that period of time.

Which means Man City have spent more money on wingers in the last 10 seasons than Leeds United, Crystal Palace, Fulham, Burnley, Brentford and countless others have spent in total on all their new signings.

Aside from the baffling sums of money involved, it’s also so fascinating that the winger positions continue to elude Guardiola. Maybe it’s an aspect of his tactics that he overlooked at Barcelona because he had Lionel Messi and inherited world class players Arjen Robben and Franck Ribery at Bayern, but either way I’m hesitant to suggest that Man City splashing the cash on another winger in January will work out well.

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Aston Villa’s clash with Leeds United on Sunday should undoubtedly be a match that fans of the club can look forward to for a number of reasons. Not only does it signify the return of domestic football and an opportunity for Unai Emery’s side to continue their good run of form in the Premier League - which currently stands at just one defeat in eight games - but it should also see the return of Youri Tielemans from injury. And that could prove to be a huge boost for the Birmingham club ahead of a testing festive period.

While Emery’s side have picked up impressive victories in the last month or so over Tottenham and Manchester City, they still have to face Brighton, Manchester United, Chelsea and Arsenal (twice) before the end of the year. And for all their recent success, Villa still find themselves sitting on the exact same points tally that they were on at this point last season. Which, unfortunately, means they’re four points off the pace set in the previous league campaign, which saw them finishing in fourth place. In a sense, the Villa Park side will likely need to raise their game in the coming weeks if they want to avoid another campaign ending in mid-table obscurity. And the return of Tielemans will undoubtedly be crucial to that.

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To Emery’s credit, he’s managed to guide Villa back towards the top of the table in recent months despite clearly lacking the same attacking edge that was so crucial to them last season. Over the course of their opening 11 league games of the season, Villa have scored just 13 goals. Their top goalscorers in the Premier League are Donyell Malen and Emiliano Buendía with just three goals each and compared to the rest of the English top-flight, only six teams have so far scored fewer goals than Emery’s team. And it’s not hard to see why.

When we take a look at which clubs are averaging the most counter-attacks and positional attacks (i.e. an open play attack that isn’t a counter-attack), we can see that Emery’s side have been pretty dreadful at both. No other club in the Premier League averages fewer counter-attacks than the Villans and just three clubs - Fulham, Crystal Palace and Burnley - average fewer positional attacks in the league this season. This has improved in recent games, with Emery’s side bagging 12 goals in their last six games, but the recent run of five wins in their last six games is probably down to the back-line conceding just three goals in those matches rather than any resurgent attacking threat.

Fortunately for Villa, this is where Tielemans should slot back into the team and make an immediate impact on their attacking capacity. While the Belgian midfielder has always been a classic No.8 or No.6 that can defend and attack in equal measure, he was unquestionably one of Villa’s most important players in the middle of the pitch last season. Not only did Tielemans dictate play and orchestrate the way Villa played on and off the ball, but he was also Emery’s most important playmaker and vital to how Villa attacked opposing teams.

When we take a look at Villa’s passing stats in the Premier League last season, we can see that Tielemans was comfortably Villa’s best player for both key passes and passes to the final third of the pitch. Over the course of the league campaign the Belgian international completed more than twice as many passes to the final third than any other Villa player and his 60 key passes was rivalled only by Morgan Rogers’ 51. Even when we break those numbers down into per 90 minutes averages, Tielemans’ average of 6.82 passes into the final third per 90 is still 44% more than the next best midfielders - Boubacar Kamara on 4.74 per 90 - and his key passes per 90 were 22% better than Rogers’.

The other crucial metric that’s worth bearing in mind here are the progressive passes of Villa’s players last season. Over the course of the 24/25 league campaign, Tielemans completed twice as many progressive passes (i.e. a pass that moves the ball 10 yards closer to the opponent’s goal) than any other player in Emery’s team. And, again, when we break that down into per 90 averages, the Belgian’s return of 6.99 far exceeds the next best players in Kamara and Pau Torres who both finished on 4.33 per 90. So by just about any playmaking metric, Tielemans was comfortably the best player in Emery’s squad last season for passing the ball into the opposing box or towards goalscoring opportunities.

Villa do have other players that can somewhat fill in when Tielemans isn’t around. For example, Matty Cash has been invaluable on the right flank this season with his passes into the final third and John McGinn and Rogers have stepped up with their key passes per game, but nobody in that Villa squad can do all of these things as well as Tielemans. And with the Belgian back in Emery’s starting XI, I wouldn’t be surprised if we see Villa’s counter-attacks and positional attacks per game rise quite dramatically in the next month. Which, in turn, should help Emery’s side through a tricky run of fixtures and keep them on track to challenge for the top six in the second half of the season.

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For a while now, I’ve wanted to find out why Xavi Simons isn’t doing as well as expected at Tottenham this season. Thomas Frank’s team have been pretty horrendous up front - they have scored just seven goals in six home games in the league and Micky Van de Ven is their top goalscorer in all competitions - so this should really be a team that was perfectly poised to welcome Simons into it to galvanise their attack and it just hasn’t really happened yet. So what’s gone wrong?

The first thing that stood out to me while watching the Dutch international against Manchester United last weekend was just how bogged down he was in the middle of the pitch. When we look at his pass map below (Opta) during the game, it’s genuinely hard to tell which end is the Spurs goal and which end is the Man Utd goal. Simons should, in theory, be firing passes from left to right, but clearly spent most of the game playing in the middle of the pitch. Rather than picking out the final key passes in the final third, he was trying to simply get Tottenham out of their own half for much of the game.

This then led me to take a look at Simons’ touches per game across the pitch and how his first eight Premier League games compared to the last few seasons in the Bundesliga. Having watched the young player for two full seasons at Leipzig, I was used to watching the midfielder dictate games, but he rarely had to do so within the boundaries of the defensive or middle third of the pitch. And, sure enough, his game has changed rather dramatically since making the move to the English top-flight this summer.

As we can see in the graph above (FBRef), Simons’ touches in the middle third and final third of the pitch have both dropped dramatically since joining the Premier League. Compared to his averages for RB Leipzig last season, in total it works out at an 18% drop or in other words 12 fewer touches of the ball per game either in the middle or final third. That may not seem like much, but it’s actually a huge drop off. And when we couple that with the fact that Simons is making slightly more touches in Spurs’ defensive third, it really suggests to me that he’s playing as a No.6 or No.8 when he should really be playing as a No.10 in Frank’s team.

The reason why this is such a big problem is that while Simons is a midfielder and certainly a good playmaker, his talents really lie in scoring goals in the final third. Either by playing off the left wing or as a No.10, Simons was constantly making runs into the box or picking out shots on the edge of it. And that just isn’t happening in Frank’s team this season. When we take a look at his non-penalty goals and assists per 90 (FBRef) in the three seasons before this one, we can see that scoring goals is a huge part of Simons’ game.

In fact, in his first season at RB Leipzig no other midfielder in the Bundesliga registered more shots than Simons and in his second season at the club only Louis Openda and Benjamin Sesko registered more shots than the Dutch midfielder in Leipzig’s squad. All of these stats point to a player that should be playing off the main striker in Frank’s team and getting shots in or around the box. But instead, we’re talking about Simons sitting on fewer shots in the Premier League than Joao Palhinha, Pape Matar Sarr and the aforementioned Van de Den.

Why this is the case is hard to really nail down. But if I had to hazard a guess, I would say it’s partly down to two main reasons. The first and perhaps most obvious one is that Simons is still adjusting to the physicality of the Premier League. As I’ve touched on in recent weeks in regards to Florian Wirtz’s tepid start at Anfield, attacking players in the Bundesliga simply aren’t subjected to the same tackling and hassling that their Premier League counterparts have to endure. So while the speed of both leagues is comparable, the ferocity and impact of the English game far exceeds the German one. That, in turn, makes Premier League games far more physically exhausting, over and above the very real problem of simply keeping control of the ball against more tenacious defenders.

The other reason is most likely tactical. Frank typically favours wide forwards over traditional wingers in his tactics and that has led to Simons playing behind a traditional striker and then two wide goalscorers in Richarlison and Mohamed Kudus. And while both forwards have looked sharp enough for Spurs this season, neither is typically known for creating goal-scoring chances for team mates. Where Simons was used to other creative players either side of him at RB Leipzig, he now has a front three in front of him that doesn’t tend to share the ball or indeed offer up shooting opportunities to the Dutch midfielder.

The truth, as is often the case, is probably somewhere in the middle. Simons has a lot of work to do if he’s going to dominate Premier League games like he used to dominate Bundesliga ones. But, if his first few months at Tottenham are anything to go by, Frank’s system and tactics aren’t exactly suited to helping him adjust to his new surroundings. And unless he and his new manager can find a way to get him playing like he did at RB Leipzig, Tottenham will continue missing out on the best aspect of his game. Which is dominating opponents in the final third and scoring goals.

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Manchester City were remarkably ruthless in their 4-1 demolition of Borussia Dortmund in the Champions League on Wednesday night. To no great surprise, Erling Haaland was as clinical as ever in front of goal and, perhaps to some surprise, Phil Foden looked back to his old self with two goals. But what really stood out to me was the shape and manner of Pep Guardiola’s team: they looked quick and direct as opposed to ponderous and overly methodical. And, unequivocally, it seemed to work wonders for the former English champions.

Although Man City had technically set up in a 4-1-4-1 formation, in practice it tended to look more like a 4-3-3 when Guardiola’s team had the ball. Nico Gonzalez was sitting in the base of midfield, with Foden and Tijjani Reijnders just in front of him. That then allowed Jérémy Doku and Savinho to support Haaland in an attacking three, which undoubtedly caused all sorts of problems for Dortmund’s defence. Whether it was Foden slotting into the space between the German side’s defence and midfield or Doku and Savinho terrorising both wing-backs in one-vs-one duels, the Bundesliga giants simply couldn’t handle the speed and purpose of Man City’s attack.

While this game undoubtedly illustrates the quality in Guardiola’s team - rumours of their demise have perhaps been greatly exaggerated - and why they should be considered among the favourites for this season’s Champions League, I think it was also the latest example of how Man City have fundamentally changed on a tactical level this season. Whether through necessity or by design, this team are simply no longer the possession-based side that once dominated the Premier League, year after year. And a look at their stats for this season only underlines that point.

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Much has been made of Haaland’s incredible goalscoring form this season and the manner in which Man City are perhaps over-reliant on the Norwegian striker to continue winning them games almost single-handedly. And, to a point, it does seem entirely justified. After last night’s goal, Haaland has now scored more goals in all competitions this season than the rest of Man City’s entire squad. When we throw assists into the mix it means that the 25-year-old talent has now scored or assisted 70 percent of Man City’s goals in the Premier League. That is obscene. But what if it was by design?

So much of modern football is about systems and players fitting into larger plans that allow teams to be better than the sum of their parts. But not every club has a player like Haaland, who remains on course to finish his career with more Champions League goals than Cristiano Ronaldo. If you have a player like that in your team, wouldn’t you also rip up your old rule book to get the very best out of him? That seems to be what Guardiola has done this season and, as we can clearly see, it’s getting the very best out of the Norwegian striker.

When we narrow in on who is scoring or creating Man City’s goals in the Premier League this season, we can quickly note that an incredible 71 percent are coming from Haaland and the other forwards in Guardiola’s team. As the graph above illustrates, that’s a huge jump on last season’s figure of 53 percent and far higher than the 59 percent figure of the two seasons prior to that. But what’s also worth noting here is how the goal contributions from midfield have taken a nosedive this season, compared to the four league campaigns before this one.

This brings us back to the performance against Dortmund. Rather than having five or six neat and tidy midfielders parked on the edge of their opponent’s box like in previous seasons, Man City funnelled all their attacks down the wings to the two wingers, with Foden supporting Haaland in the middle of the pitch. This lines up with the team’s Premier League stats, which point to Man City’s passes per attacking sequence falling from a high of 5.58 two seasons ago to 4.69 this season. Admittedly, they’re still the highest in the English top-flight, but that means Guardiola’s team are making 16 percent fewer passes per attacking move. And it’s that slight shift in midfield tactics that stands out when we take a look at how their midfielders are playing this season and compare it to last season’s midfielders.

When we plot Man City’s main midfielders last season (orange) and this season (blue) based on how many successful dribbles and how many touches in the box they average per Premier League game, we can see how much has changed in the last 12 months. Last season, Guardiola’s midfield was made up of Bernardo Silva, Kevin de Bruyne and Foden all having plenty of presence in the box but with very little need to dribble up and down the pitch. However, this time around, we can see that Reijnders, Gonzalez and Foden are all averaging pretty impressive dribble stats, while making far fewer runs into the box.

This makes sense when we consider Man City’s new style of play. Where Guardiola once relied on players like De Bruyne, Silva and Ilkay Gundogan to dominate games through possession and really pressure teams back into their own final third, it feels as though the former English champions are now foregoing all of that to just get the ball into the box to Haaland as quickly as possible. In return, it’s led to players like Foden and Silva having less of a presence in the box, but if the England international’s goals on Wednesday night are anything to go by, he’ll have no issue scoring or creating goals from outside the penalty area.

Whether all of this is by design or simply through necessity remains to be seen. Perhaps when Rodri does finally return to full fitness, Man City will have the muscle and technique to once again dominate games across the pitch. But for now, Guardiola has found a new system that bypasses his team’s reliance on possession football and in return it is getting the very best out of their world class striker. And it will be interesting to see how far it can get them in the Premier League and Champions League this season.

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Sunday’s Premier League clash between Liverpool and Manchester United was a fascinating watch. From the opening and entirely unexpected goal from Bryan Mbeumo, to Arne Slot’s side finally getting the all-important equaliser, only for the Red Devils to snatch all three points in a truly incredible winner from Harry Maguire. It was excellent entertainment. But it was also a little stupid.

Like a heavyweight fight that was coming down to which lumbering athlete could stay on his feet the longest, both teams eventually forwent any concept of tactical control in favour of utter chaos. This was most apparent after Liverpool’s triple substitute change in the 62nd minute, which gave the Anfield side no less than four players in attack, anchored to a one-man midfield of Curtis Jones. Arne Slot’s side may have stuck the ball in the back of the net 16 minutes later, but that couldn’t mask the complete lack of control from the Premier League champions.

During the match Diana Kristinne quite succinctly described her team’s performance as: “the vibes are terrible and that matters most.” And while that may seem a little reductive, I think it really gets to the heart of Slot’s problems this season. Liverpool haven’t lost four games in a row because their forwards can’t score goals or their defenders can’t stop conceding them; it’s the something in between that is all off. In other words, Liverpool have lost their balance and it’s completely derailing their hopes of defending the Premier League title.

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Forgetting Klopp’s golden rule for attack

Naturally, it would be easy to point to the notable drop-off in performances from both Mohamed Salah and Virgil van Dijk as the main reasons behind both ends of Liverpool’s team no longer functioning like they once did. And there’s little reason to suggest that both players aren’t experiencing the simple impact of ageing that each and every footballer eventually succumbs to. But blaming this entire mess on individual performances feels like a red herring that we’d do well to ignore for now. Liverpool’s problems are bigger than that. And the blame may be better placed at Slot’s feet or at least aimed towards the men that conducted the club’s summer transfer activity.

As I wrote after the opening-day win over Bournemouth, Liverpool’s new-look team were already notably top-heavy. Even before Alexander Isak joined the club. And that has only become more and more apparent since then. Understandably, fans of the Anfield club pointed to the departure of Darwin Núñez, Luis Díaz, Harvey Elliott and the tragic passing of Diogo Jota for the need to sign two strikers in Isak and Hugo Ekitiké, as well as a new No.10 in Florian Wirtz. But nobody seemed particularly interested in explaining how all of these players would fit into Slot’s starting XI. And, crucially, how they would all work alongside one another.

Clearly, if Sunday’s game is anything to go by, Slot hasn’t figured that out yet. Salah looked entirely isolated on the right wing, Isak struggled to impose himself on the match at all and Wirtz started on the bench. Despite the remarkable sums of money spent in the summer on attacking talent, it was actually Cody Gakpo who registered the most shots towards goal. But at no point did any of the front three seem as though they were singing from the same hymn sheet or were indeed working towards the same goal.

Watching this striker stramash unfold, I was reminded of what made Jürgen Klopp’s attack always work; Salah was the focal point of attack, Sadio Mané was the support striker on the opposite wing but in between all of that was Roberto Firmino. While the Brazilian attacker never tended to top the charts for goals or assists, he covered the space behind Mané and Salah, made space by dragging defenders out of position and most importantly provided balance to their gung-ho natures.

Following Liverpool’s 3-2 win over Atletico Madrid in the Champions League in late 2021, Klopp explained why Firmino was so crucial to Liverpool’s attack. “He is a very important player to us,” said Klopp. “He is a connector. He is the best offensive defender I ever saw in my life, definitely. He is a ball chaser, he is defensively incredibly smart with all the things he is doing. He is technically on the highest level, is able to play in the smallest spaces, the tiniest spaces. Can make incredibly good decisions in a really short time.” That term - “offensive defender” - is the crucial part of that quote. Not only because it perfectly describes Firmino’s role for Liverpool but also points to what Slot’s team are desperately missing this season.

Over the course of his eight seasons in the Premier League, Firmino averaged 0.47 tackles in the final third per 90, with that figure rising as high as 0.91 in the 21/22 season. Mané, despite being better known as a goalscorer or playmaker, was also remarkably useful in Liverpool’s attempts to defend from the front and averaged 0.41 tackles in the final third per 90 during his time at Anfield. And, when we compare that to this season’s front line we can quickly see where the problems lie.

When we pull up the top 10 Liverpool players for most tackles per 90 in the final third for this season and the previous two campaigns, we get a table like the one above. And what’s hopefully apparent upon first glance is that the number of tackles being made deep within the opposition box has steadily fallen among these top players in the last two seasons. So much so that Liverpool actually only have eight players who have registered tackles in the final third in this current league campaign.

In Klopp’s final season he clearly weaponised Ryan Gravenberch and Alexis Mac Allister as his ball-winning midfielders, but we should also note that both Diaz and Núñez averaged very impressive averages that were similar to what Firmino and Mané used to achieve in his previous teams. In Slot’s first season he also had the benefit of Núñez’s closing down, alongside a preference to play Gakpo on the wing in place of Diaz, which explains the rise of the Dutchman and the Colombian dropping down to 0.22 tackles per 90 due to him playing as a false No.9.

However, rather than focusing on the green scores - which show Alexis Mac Allister and Wirtz doing well this season - we should note the diminishing beige scores and the growing number of red/pink scores. Not only is there a notable shift in Slot’s first season away from players making tackles in the final third, but we also saw the likes of Salah, Dominik Szoboszlai and the aforementioned Diaz drop into concerningly low averages. And now, to no great surprise, Slot seemingly only has two players among his entire midfield and attack, putting up solid numbers for tackles in the final third.

Of course, there are mitigating factors to consider here. Slot has had to constantly shuffle his right-back position, meaning Szoboszlai has often played in defence rather than midfield and we can’t ignore the fact that many of these new players are still finding their feet at Liverpool. Can we conclusively say that Slot has no idea what he’s doing just eight games into the league campaign? No, of course not. But we can be concerned.

What’s perhaps most worrying is that none of Slot’s new forwards look like they’re prepared to be what Klopp would call Liverpool’s “best offensive defender”. Salah certainly won’t do it, Gakpo showed no signs of it against Man Utd, Ekitike is first and foremost a penalty-box goalscorer and Liverpool certainly didn’t break the British transfer record to sign Isak and then task the Swede with being a final-third water carrier. Perhaps Federico Chiesa would happily take on such a selfless role for Liverpool, but that would require Slot to drop one of his star forwards.

Ultimately, this all comes back to balance. Klopp didn’t get Liverpool to where they are today with star-studded teams that crammed as many forward players into their starting XI as their wage and transfer budget would allow. The German tactician had workhorses throughout his squad and often picked the players that would run through walls for him and their team over individual brilliance. And as a result, he bequeathed Slot a team that was well-drilled and ready to challenge for the Premier League title.

I guess what this season will undoubtedly show us is whether the Dutch manager still intends to stick with the system and tactics that he inherited from Klopp last season, or double down with what we’ve seen so far until it begins to work. Maybe Liverpool can find a way to win league titles and Champions Leagues with three or four strikers on the pitch. But right now his teams lack balance, they lack that “offensive defender” and are ultimately a far cry from the team that won the Premier League last season.

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Pep Guardiola’s team haven’t been truly terrible in the first few months of the new season but 13 points from their first seven Premier League games is the club’s worst ever start since the Spaniard took over. And that’s a pretty remarkable stat when you consider that it coexists alongside the fact that Erling Haaland has scored 10 goals and assists in those seven league games.

In no uncertain terms, Man City have been sub-par and in many ways dragged from one game to the next almost single-handedly by Haaland’s goals. This was evident on Sunday when his goal - which was very much an individual effort - was the sole distinction between Man City and their opponents. It was also the case a few days prior, when Monaco would have surely claimed all three points had it not been for Haaland’s brace. The Norwegian striker labelled his team’s performance as “not good enough” after the game and few had the courage to disagree.

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Indeed, it’s not hard to see why Haaland may be deeply frustrated at how Man City have been playing lately. After all, the Norwegians striker’s 10 goals and assists in the Premier League make up 67% of the total goals scored by Man City in the league. Only Jaidon Anthony at Burnley and Bournemouth forward Antoine Semenyo have a higher share of their team’s goals. If we want to take another look at Haaland’s dominance in this team, we can take a look at the xG make up of Guardiola’s squad and compare it to that of Liverpool and Arsenal.

As we can see, while Haaland makes up a massive 65% of Man City’s total xG in the league this season, the highest at Liverpool is Hugo Ekitike with just 21% and at Arsenal it’s Viktor Gyokeres on 23%. Of course, Haaland is a world-class player and certainly more accomplished in the Premier League than Ekitike and Gyokeres, but his goals mask some real problems at Man City. And when we dive into some more stats we can see where Guardiola’s team have been faltering this season.

A good place to start is in defence, where Guardiola’s team have perhaps kept clean sheets against Wolves, Man Utd, a 10-man Napoli and now Brentford, but have also conceded eight goals in their other five games. In midfield, Guardiola’s team desperately miss Rodri and have completely abandoned the high press that has brought them so much success over the last eight seasons, with only West Ham pressing opposition teams less than Man City this season.

But it’s perhaps back in attack that we see the biggest drop off. Where Man City could call upon outstanding playmakers like Kevin de Bruyne or Ilkay Gundogan, they’ve now got an ageing Bernardo Silva and an out-of-form Phil Foden. And when we bring this all back to Haaland and the lack of service that he actually gets per game, we can see in this graph that despise his super human non-penalty goals per 90 record still being truly world class, he actually receives fewer passes per game than most of the strikers in the league.

Of course, Man City still have to welcome Omar Marmoush back from injury and we’ll need to see if new signings Rayan Cherki and Tijjani Reijnders can step up in attack, but as things stand at this moment in time, Man City are a very average team with a world class striker. And if they didn’t have a striker up front like Haaland who can make the most of very few chances or create goals out of almost nothing, like we saw against Brentford, then I think Guardiola’s team would be in a lot more trouble. No squad is truly a one-man team, but right now Man City are as close to it as you can get at the highest level.

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Maresca’s Premier League record to date

In terms of overall success, Maresca still has a very decent record at Chelsea. Since he joined them, the Stamford Bridge club have been the fourth best club in the Premier League. Which is no easy achievement. When we take a look at Maresca’s record in the league, we can see that his points-per-game average is better than his predecessors Mauricio Pochettino’s and Graham Potter. However, as we can also see, Maresca is still somewhat behind Thomas Tuchel and Maurzio Sarri. And his average is 18% less than what Antonio Conte achieved at the club. So in a very real sense, Maresca has been a notable improvement on Potter and Pochettino. But still hasn’t reached the heights of Tuchel, Sarri and Conte. But while at this moment in time there’s plenty to critique about his tactics, in-game substitutions or even the discipline of his side, I think there is a bigger issue at the club holding him and his team back.

Chelsea’s peculiar transfer policy

My issue is with Chelsea’s current transfer policy under the club’s relatively new owners. We all know that Chelsea have spent an obscene amount of money on new players and made an equally impressive amount of money on selling players this year. But my issue is with the club’s policy of selling key first team players just because a decent offer came along. As we can see in the graph, four of Maresca’s eight best players for non-penalty goals and assists last season left the club this summer. And while very few Chelsea fans will be gutted about losing Jadon Sancho, I think there are genuine concerns about the club moving on players like Nicolas Jackson, Noni Madueke and even Christopher Nkunku.

The club have tried to replace those players with younger stars who could have the potential to be better, but at this moment in time is Maresca’s team actually better now that they’ve replaced Jackson, Madueke and Nkunku with Liam Delap, Alejandro Garnacho and Jamie Gittens? Even if we take a look at the club’s biggest sales under Todd Boehly & Co, we can see that many of the players the club have sold since 2022 would probably still make it into Maresca’s best XI this season.

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Perhaps the better question is whether Chelsea’s current owners even have any intention of letting Maresca build a squad around these young players and help them develop into top talents. Or will they also be sold if huge offers come in for them in the future? In the past, Chelsea sold young academy players to bring in established first team players. But this new ownership group seems to be selling established first team players to bring in more young players. And while we certainly can’t say for certain whether any of this will work, it’s clearly had a huge impact on Maresca’s squad in the short term. And severely limited his ability to build on what his team achieved last season.

Maresca essentially took Chelsea to the top four and won a European trophy last season, but is the club even interested in going further than that? It’s really hard to say at this moment in time and that’s perhaps why the club’s poor start to the season isn’t entirely down to their manager.

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Glasner’s Record to Date

If you’ve been living under a rock for the last 18 months or perhaps support Charlton or Millwall, you might not have been paying attention to what’s been happening at Selhurst Park. But in case you’re interested, it’s worth taking a look at what Glasner has achieved since he joined the club in February 2024.

While his FA Cup win against Manchester City and the Community Shield victory over Liverpool have elevated Glasner above most of his predecessors, it’s his success in the Premier League that has truly made him stand out.

When we look at Glasner’s overall record in all competitions and compare it to all previous Crystal Palace managers who have coached at least 30 games, he comes out on top with an impressive points-per-game ratio of 1.76.

When we filter this down to Premier League performances, we see that Glasner is currently averaging 1.54 points per game in the English top flight. This is not only the best record Crystal Palace has ever had, but it’s also a 25% increase on Roy Hodgson’s record.

Better than a mid-table side?

You may have already suspected that Glasner was probably Palace’s best-ever manager in the Premier League, but when we place that record within the context of the wider league, it really shows where Palace are heading.

For example, since joining the club, only five Premier League managers have picked up more points than Glasner has done at Crystal Palace. He’s also averaging more points per game than Fabian Hurzeler at Brighton, Andoni Iraola at Bournemouth, and Thomas Frank, who was at Brentford and is now at Tottenham.

So even though Glasner’s Palace has finished mid-table in back-to-back seasons, his overall record suggests that the club is actually performing far better on the pitch. In fact, Glasner’s performances suggest that Palace is a club that should be aiming higher than the top eight or even top six. His numbers indicate that they’re not performing like a mid-table club, but are doing far better.

Glasner’s impressive tactics

A good way to illustrate Glasner’s tactics is by looking at a graph of every Premier League club based on their number of counter-attacks per game and shots on target per game. As we can see, Palace are in the top-left corner, which shows that they create plenty of chances, but certainly don’t do so by playing box-to-box football. Rather than relying on a swashbuckling, end-to-end style, Glasner’s team is far more composed and has a set style of play that gets them results.

This is because Glasner can rely on a fantastic back three of Marc Guéhi, Chris Richards, and Maxence Lacroix - the latter of whom thrived under Glasner at Wolfsburg - and the outstanding central midfielder Adam Wharton in front of them.

As such, Palace has the players to deal with most attacking threats in the league. For the most part, they sit back and let teams attack, then find ways to pick them off. This would explain why, remarkably, only Manchester City, Arsenal, and Liverpool have conceded fewer goals than Crystal Palace in the Premier League since Glasner joined the club. This is further backed up when we look at where teams typically touch the ball when they play against Crystal Palace. While Palace isn’t particularly bothered about closing teams down in the middle of the pitch, only Manchester City and Arsenal allowed fewer dribbles into their own box than Glasner’s side last season.

Conclusion

So, what does this all mean for Crystal Palace’s future? Well, we have a team that doesn’t concede many goals, can tactically control games, and is led by a manager who is statistically the sixth-best in the Premier League.

On top of that, Glasner is a manager who, prior to moving to England, got his first club in Austria promoted, took Wolfsburg from 7th to 4th, and then took Eintracht Frankfurt from 11th to 7th while winning a Europa League title.

Glasner is an outstanding tactician and a very adept man manager. But more than anything else, he seems to be a manager that can vastly improve the standing of every single club he sinks his teeth into. So while Crystal Palace did get into European football through the FA Cup last season, there’s no real reason why they shouldn’t be aiming for the European spots in this season’s Premier League.

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The Good News: Playmaking and Passing

In terms of playmaking, Wirtz's statistics are definitely down on last season, but they’re not as concerning as they might seem. While his passes into the penalty area have dropped from 2.49 to 1.25 per 90, his passes into the final third have actually risen from 3.68 to 4.0 per 90. Furthermore, his key passes per 90 have risen from 2.18 to 2.25. In a sense, he's playing a little further back and providing more initial passes in a play rather than the final, killer ball. This helps to explain why his expected assists have dropped from 0.36 to 0.17 per 90.

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Wirtz's Changed Role at Liverpool

Last season at Leverkusen, Wirtz completed almost four times more successful dribbles than the next-best player. This season, for Liverpool, he sits fourth behind Hugo Ekitike, Cody Gakpo, and Ryan Gravenberch. Similarly, he made almost twice as many dribbles into the penalty area as any other player at Leverkusen, but now he falls behind Gakpo and Mohamed Salah. On the whole, Wirtz's touches per game have dropped significantly. When we look at where that drop-off is, we can see that while his touches in the middle third of the pitch have only dropped by 18%, his touches in the final third and penalty box have dropped by a massive 34%.

The Real Problem: No Longer the Main Goalscorer

This is largely because Liverpool already has world-class players to do the business in the final third. Salah is the obvious example, but Ekitike and Alexander Isak have also joined the club, alongside the likes of Gakpo and Dominik Szoboszlai. As such, alongside Wirtz’s diminished role in the final third, his shots per 90 have dropped by 39%, and his shots on target per 90 have dropped by a massive 63%. Last season, he finished top of Leverkusen’s squad for total shots and shots on target, but so far this season, he is joint fourth in Slot’s team with as many shots and shots on target as Gravenberch.

This is perhaps the biggest concern for Wirtz. He is an excellent passer and playmaker and can find a way to fit into Liverpool’s midfield and facilitate Salah and company, as well as Alexis Mac Allister, Gravenberch, or Szoboszlai. But so far at Liverpool, he hasn’t been able to show any of his goalscoring potential. Until Slot can find a way to get Wirtz among the goals like Salah, Ekitike, or Isak, he will only be able to show a portion of his full potential for his new club.

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